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Much of the accountability literature itself examines governance issues, be it decision-making and delegation, EU policy and 
decision-making mechanism, regulatory status, multi-level governance, executive power and bureaucracy. Financial 
responsibility is at the center of political responsibility and, however, issues related to financial management have been 
marginalized in school discussions on the EU. Audit and evaluation involve examining the development of policies, 
implementation procedures and their consequences to provide an assessment of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
an entity or activity. From the sociological and discursive point of view of institutionalism, responsibility is "carried out" by 
the EU institutions, on paper and in meetings, each trying to define the standards of responsibility. Special reports offer the 
opportunity to "account" for EU policy and thus "account" for the success or failure of the implementation of the Commission 
and the Member States. 
 
Keywords: Accountability Methodology, Paying-agencies Election Governance, Performance Human Resource Model, 
Recruitment Explosion and Special Report. 
 
1. Introduction to the analysis of the audit methodology 
Auditing is a blurred concept that is difficult to define and is used in different ways in different contexts (DeNichilo 
2019a). General concepts include audit, inspection and control: evaluation of EU cohesion policy functions under the general 
audit term (Power 1994). To analyze EU reform, this work takes an equally broad approach to auditing, which includes (for 
cohesion policy): verification of the effective functioning of Member States' controls, as undertaken by the Commission 
services and bodies independent in the EU Member States; and control of projects financed through desk-based controls and 
on-site inspections through the management and certification (i.e. payment) of the Structural Fund authorities in the Member 
States. As an external audit body, the European Court of Auditors (hereafter the Court) is not by definition part of the internal 
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audit / control framework under shared management, although administrative reforms in the Commission have had an impact 
on audit activities of the Court and, as will be discussed below, for the voice of this institution in the post-reform era. 
From a theoretical point of view, the fundamental functional properties of audit and control are well captured in the 
classical terms of the main agent (Power 1994): a monitoring technology used to eliminate moral hazard and information 
asymmetries between an agent and its principal in order to restore or improve trust. The use of audit and control as political 
technology in government has grown since the 1980s - represented as an explosion of Audit by Power (1994, 1997) - with its 
roots in the erosion of society's trust and public sector management changes that require greater accounting, verification and 
control. In the EU context, similar factors explain the shift of the audit regime. An administrative reform program in 2000 
was triggered by an EU financial management scandal and legitimacy crisis (Balint et al. 2008). Of primary concern here are 
the subsequent effects on policy implementation and the results in EU cohesion policy. The starting point is to specify the 
implications for the audit and how the process has transformed the scope and intensity of the audit, control and reporting 
activity (DeNichilo 2019b). The main questions are: what form did the audit explosion take and why? What are the 
consequences? And how effectively has it solved the underlying problems? The assessment of the form of the EU audit 
explosion can draw on comparative administration literature, which documents two distinct public sector audit models: the 
compliance model and the performance model (Barzelay 1997; Pollit 1999). The compliance model has its roots in the 
financial audit based on the accounting practices of private companies (Power 1997) and the internal accounting in the 
government can be traced back to millennia. Fraud and error detection was the original goal of the financial review and a 
close association remains. The compliance audit focuses on legal and administrative compliance and on the probity and 
correctness of the administration, financial systems and management control systems. 
Performance auditing has developed since the mid-1980s (Pollit 1999). It resembles evaluation in probing the efficiency 
and effectiveness of public programs, but is undertaken in a similar way to auditing (Barzelay 1997). The easily quantifiable 
numerical indicators used in financial accounting are complemented by qualitative output-oriented indicators. The focus 
shifts accordingly from inputs to outputs and outcomes of public sectoral activities (Pollitt 1999). The pace and extent of the 
transition to performance auditing varies internationally. The leaders are the United Kingdom, Australia, North America and 
Scandinavia (Barzelay 1997; Pollitt 1999). Countries that adopt performance-oriented management doctrines have generally 
been proactive in auditing performance. Countries with a stronger tradition of administrative law and a strong Rechtsstaat 
(e.g. France, Germany and Italy) have been more cautious. A similar correlation applies to internal audit and control 
experiences (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Power 2005). 
This literature suggests that an explosion of the EU audit should take or approach the shape of the performance model. 
After all, the new public management principles were the basis of the Commission's administrative reform program (Knill 
and Balint 2008), which said it sought to improve effectiveness, focus on performance and provide more profitable training in 
financial management, audit and control. Furthermore, more than other EU policy areas, cohesion policy has established 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for evaluating policy performance, creating pre-existing knowledge that would 
facilitate performance auditing (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, Pollit et al. 1999). 
This leads to the second question relating to the behavioral impacts of the growth of the audit, for which the thesis of the 
explosion of Power's audit highlighted several pathologies. The audit explosion (Power 2002) may result in a priority decline 
  
 
European Journal of Social Impact and Circular Economy - ISSN: 2704-9906  
DOI: 10.13135/2704-9906/4608 Published by University of Turin http://www.ojs.unito.it/index.php/ejsice/index 
EJSICE content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License   
21 
in the provision of public services due to resource costs. An organization that wants to survive an audit must invest in 
reporting, monitoring and control systems, rather than improving performance (Power 1994). Additionally, the growth of 
audit and control can aggravate mistrust (Power 2000b). Auditors can play elaborate games of non-compliance and the 
auditors' working methods can be questioned. Furthermore, the unproven benefits of the audit tend to be accepted, when the 
effectiveness of the audit should actually be called into question (Power 1997). Finally, auditors or controllers can become de 
facto policy makers by repositioning competencies in the public management hierarchy (Power 2005). And therefore, there is 
the question of whether administrative reforms in the field of audit and control are strengthening the Commission's 
governance capacities. This concerns the Commission's ability to manage policy effectively, as well as the effects of 
strengthening the legitimacy of administrative reform (Cini 2008). Before testing these propositions, it is necessary to 
corroborate the claim that an audit explosion occurred and that its origins lie in the Commission's administrative reform 
(Power 2015). 
The introduction and the background place the study within the audit and control of the European community on the 
different states. The elimination of moral hazard between different levels of government is properly debated according to 
literature and practice references. The literature identifies and coherently argues the issue of auditing by the European 
Commission and cohesion policies, with a balance of powers by recalling the reforms that have taken place.  
The purpose of the paper is to provide evidence and reporting of European methodologies for the election of people who 
will have administrative, accounting and political responsibilities (DeNichilo 2020). For similar papers that use the same 
elaborations in public choice you can consider the following recent ones: Berkowitz, Monfort and Pieńkowski (2020); 
Courtney and Powell (2020); Pavić, Turk, Grgić and Prišenk (2020) and Van Wolleghem (2020). 
 
2. The explosion of recruitment as a performance model 
The audit explosion clearly led to significant changes in the Commission's organizational, strategic and operational 
approaches (Power 2011). The question is whether these changes were driven by ambitions to increase policy performance or 
ensure regulatory compliance. The previous account does not support the expected shift towards the performance model, but 
strongly points towards a compliance model. This is evident in the emphasis and strength of compliance-based measures 
implemented since the mid-2000s: faster suspension and correction procedures; Member States' action plans and their corrective 
follow-up; an increase in the scope and intensity of the audits; and stricter closure procedures. 
Seeking has been to improve the regularity and legality of expenditure, to support pressure from the Court and Parliament 
to reduce the error rate. Noteworthy is the emphasis of the data on the sanctions instrument of financial corrections and 
recoveries, as underlined by the administrative reform program, the roadmap for internal control and the control plan and by 
the Court and Parliament on an ongoing basis. However, as claimed by one of the Court's auditors: by their very nature, financial 
corrections can be applied alone in the event of proven violation of specific rules. They are therefore much better suited to 
sanctioning violations of legality and regularity rather than weaknesses in terms of sound financial management. Another 
consequence of the Commission's roadmap has been found in annual declarations including summaries of Member States' 
audits and opinions on cohesion policy expenditure. 
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Again, this appears to be yet another compliance exercise with punitive characteristics rather than a real tool to stimulate 
learning about effectiveness, as the following comments from a hearing of the Parliament indicate: when asked if these 
summaries had allowed them to learn something useful, the Commission replied: "Not yet" (which is, I believe, the 
Commission's language for "no"). But when asked if all Member States had complied with the request, the Commission replied 
that Germany had not done so and that the Commission was initiating an infringement procedure. These are the early days, but 
there is something daunting in finding that these procedures add - so far - little value to the Commission, but represent a new 
way for Member States to find themselves in violation of a regulation. This interpretation is reinforced by evidence that the 
Commission only checked whether the Member States had submitted the annual summaries, had not undertaken any analysis 
of the content of the added value of the documents and paid little attention to the performance targets and methods. The priority 
given to obtaining guarantees from the Member States was a key feature of the 2006 reforms for the audit and control of rules 
in cohesion policy. 
The main innovation was a "conformity assessment" exercise to ensure that all the management and control systems of the 
program "procedurally" comply with the requirements (Power 2011). The process was conflicting, with the Commission 
rejecting more than half of the first submissions of descriptions of audit systems and strategies; this includes countries that 
previously signed trust agreements with the Commission. Recent developments indicate a future step towards the performance 
model, even the key parameter of the performance audit - attention to results and impact as part of the audit - does not seem to 
be on the horizon (Power 2011). In 2007-2013, greater emphasis was placed on the so-called "single audit model", which 
constitutes a clearer division of responsibility between the Commission and the Member States, with each level combining its 
security on the next during the various stages. of implementation. This promises less duplication of efforts, more cooperative 
relationships and greater trust, whether the model will work as promised remains to be seen. Furthermore, in moving to a control 
approach, the Commission may face another challenge: the economic and epistemic impossibility of direct control when it 
reaffirms control (Power 2011). 
Furthermore, the Commission stresses that audit and control should be seen as a learning process. The goal is not only to 
identify problems (such as fraud or major errors), but also to propose solutions (in order to prevent minor errors), supported by 
a more bottom-up approach, oriented towards risk management (rather than driven by the sanction) approach (Power 2011). 
One of these Commission measures was the provision of a self-assessment tool to the Member States in 2007. However, these 
softer measures were superimposed on the existing compliance model and are diminished by the scope and intensity of the 
compliance actions implemented by recent years. 
Three key factors explain the nature of the audit explosion and the consequences. The first reflects a fundamental political 
choice by Parliament, the Court (in particular in relation to the discharge of the budget) and the Council's budget group to 
prioritize compliance over performance (Power 2011). Furthermore, there is no specific Council specific committee for 
cohesion policy which focuses on: assessing the concerns related to the performance of EU cohesion policy. This political 
dimension largely explains why the Commission's administrative reform program had a strong logical bureaucratic impact 
(Ellinas and Suleiman 2008), despite claims about its ideals for new public management. 
Secondly, the Commission's financial crisis and the program of administrative reforms have led to a redistribution of power 
and resources, in Parliament and in the Court (in the post-Santer era). In addition to strengthening the influence of the EU 
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budgetary authorities, it has enabled them to defend the new status quo, thus maintaining the ongoing administrative reform 
(Cini 2008) of auditing and control more firmly on the compliance path. This growing pressure largely explains the injustice 
perceived by the auditors in the Member States (see below). It also contradicts claims about administrative reform led primarily 
by the Commission, at least in the field of audit and control. 
Third, the current institutional structure of shared management - where the Commission's power to establish rules (based on 
its responsibility for the budget) is not accompanied by an equivalent power over the implementation of the budget - necessarily 
implies a high degree risk of delegation, especially the highly devolved and dispersed delivery model of cohesion policy. As 
noted by the head of the audit department, it is not possible to provide Member States with a blank check and to rely on Member 
States' audit systems because when the Court of Auditors carries out its own checks in the Member States, the Commission 
will not blame the errors. Member states. A more rigorous approach to compliance is needed to address the problem of high 
levels of irregularities (Harber, Marx and De Jager 2020). 
 
3. Introduction to the concept of Accountability 
Responsibility has always been intrinsic to the research and practice of democratic governance. Responsibility concerns "the 
construction of an agreed language or currency of speech on the conduct and performance and the criteria that should be used 
to evaluate them" (Day and Klein 1987). Responsibility rests on a combination of structures and procedures, in addition to the 
socialization of public officials about what is appropriate in the conduct of public affairs. According to March and Olsen, the 
traditions of democracy require political officials to account for their actions; report, explain and justify any exercise of 
authority; and sanction if necessary. Public officials should act in anticipation of having to account for their actions. 
Responsibility is based on regulation, the process, setting standards and presenting accounts for actions. Peterson underlines 
the challenge the EU faces due to the coexistence of shared sovereignty and divided responsibility (de Haan , Schoenmaker and 
Wierts 2020). The establishment of the European Court of Auditors and other audit institutions in the EU is an attempt to 
promote collective responsibility for coping with shared sovereignty. There are four forms of responsibility: 
a) administrative liability; 
b) parliamentary responsibility; 
c) election responsibility; 
d) judicial liability. 
 
Interestingly, it did not include financial liability in its categorization. However, financial responsibility is an essential part 
of accountability in any democratic political system, given the importance of the public purse. Financial responsibility or the 
audit process are related to both administrative and parliamentary responsibility (Manes Rossi, Brusca and Condor 2020). A 
key feature of the administrative budget processes is "to ensure responsibility, that the funds are actually spent for the intended 
purposes, that the programs are executed as planned and that the funds, coming from any source, are not spent on unauthorized 
activities" The budget processes also support managerial functions, linking the financial decision-making process to the 
performance of the program (Köhler, Ratzinger-Sakel and Theis 2020). In addition, the audits provide the raw material for the 
budget control committees of the national and European parliaments, hence the contribution to parliamentary responsibility. 
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Democratic theory underlines the importance of two mechanisms as a basis for accountability. This is information and 
sanctions. The Court of Auditors is not a judicial court capable of imposing sanctions on other actors. Rather, its contribution 
to accountability in the EU. it is based on the provision of authoritative information to political bas institutions ate on audits 
that allow them to monitor and improve financial management. The European Court of Auditors was established in 1977 in 
response to the weakness of the pre-existing Audit Committee of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Auditor 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The change in the financing of the EU budget following the budget treaties 
of 1970 and 1975 created political pressure to establish a stronger external audit capacity in the EU. Once established, the Court 
worked to strengthen its mandate and influence the evolution of financial responsibility in the Union. In addition to the 
functional tasks associated with the external audit, the Court of Auditors has acted to improve the regulatory framework for 
financial liability in the Union. The Court was part of a larger defense coalition for better financial management in the EU. 
As an external audit body, the Court exercises its role by providing information on the management of the Union's finances 
to the executive and parliamentary bodies of the Union at EU and national level (March 1995). It has no judicial functions and 
does not impose sanctions on individual officials or institutions. So the basis of his contribution is based on the result of his 
audits as expressed in the reports. Responsibility is promoted through the publication and dissemination of information on 
financial management systems and practices in the EU. The Court increases accountability in the Union by conducting its audits 
professionally and reporting on the results of its audits. The basis of the Court's contribution to accountability in the Union is 
based on two pillars of information and publication. In addition, the expectation of an external audit influences the behavior of 
public officials engaged in the deployment of EU funds at EU and national level. The fact that public officials know that their 
actions can be reviewed by an external audit body affects the way they deal with EU finances (Fredriksson, Kiran and Niemi 
2020). 
 
4. Organization settings of Supreme Audit Institutions 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs), including statutory auditors, auditor courts and public or public sector certifiers, play an 
important role in strengthening government and public sector responsibility (Marchesi 2000). This is done through their 
examination and reporting of government financial reports, including government agencies, authorities, companies and 
subsidiaries (i.e. audit of financial reports). Not only performance or audits with a good quality-price ratio of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the use of public funds, but also other judicial reviews, including environmental audits. This study extends the 
previous literature (De Martinis and Clark, 2007) by examining the enabling legislation of the SAIs of the 25 member countries 
of the European Union (EU) and the European Court of Auditors (ECA). 
The study examines the provisions contained therein that deal with the scope of parliamentary powers on the accountability 
of SAIs to parliament, as well as the independence, supervision, mandate and funding of SAIs. Given the importance of the EU 
and the economic, political and social diversity of its member countries, it is useful to examine the enabling legislation of their 
SAIs (Colella 2000). 
The wave of spectacular corporate collapses and frauds worldwide, including Enron, HIH, Parmalat, Tyco, WorldCom and 
Xerox, is well known, has highlighted the need for greater corporate and regulatory governance. All over the world and in the 
aftermath of these corporate collapses and fraud and, in particular, the disappearance of Arthur Andersen, the adequacy of the 
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auditor's legal requirements and professional standards for carrying out a quality audit have been subject to a greater control, 
in particular the auditor's independence. A significant achievement was in the United States, where the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 was issued, creating a stricter corporate governance and accountability regime, including a climate of stricter rules on 
independence of control. In other countries, government regulatory and professional bodies have also followed suit with 
changes (proposals) similar to legislation and / or professional standards for the purpose of improving corporate governance, 
including audit quality. Interestingly, well before the entry into force of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the European 
Commission had proposed to improve the independence of auditors by setting minimum standards, in particular as regards the 
mandatory guarantee systems of the quality, since Member States have been found to operate with voluntary or partial systems 
or without a system (Caruana and Kowalczyk 2020). 
 
5. Institutional Challenges: Review Special Report 
Performance auditing is “a Knowledge-based activity” and that owing to its “special features” it requires “special 
competences” (European Parliament 2012). It is an “investigation discipline that requires flexibility, imagination and analytical 
skills. Excessively detailed procedures, methods and standards may hamper the effective functioning of performance auditing. 
Auditors traditionally have experience in public and private sector financial/compliance auditing but are not familiar with the 
appropriate methodologies for performace/value-for-money auditing (Van der Meer and Edelebos 2006). The Court’s 
management has been obliged to support the training of staff through professional education in performance auditing, for both 
auditors and members by developing a professional diploma course in public-sector auditing, finance and accounting as a 
qualifying tool. The Court is now hiring auditors from a variety of academic disciplines. Beyond accountants, economists and 
lawyers, its staff increasingly includes psychologists, linguists, social scientists, geographers and medics, policy expertise in 
performance audit requires professional qualification in, and in-depth practical knowledge of, a range of policy areas. It pushed 
through internal restructuring, creating vertical chambers with decision-making powers delegated to them away from the 
College. This brought efficiency gain but resulted in “silo-ing” with each chamber insulating itself, competing to out-perform 
the other in producing special reports. The Court is now much more conscious of its external profile. A communication 
department was created around the president to “professionalise” and actively promote the Court’s recommendations, with 
greater attentions paid to presentation. Adopting private sectors norms, the Court now talks of disseminating its “products” to 
its “clients” or “stakeholders” (See table 1). Compliance audit work will likely always receive a bed press, its impact hard to 
ascertain in terms of improved accountability (Homer and Stephenson 2012). 
 
Tab. 1 Reports submitted to the Court of Auditors. 
1. Annual reports / statements of assurance. 
2. Up grade procedure services. 
3. Confort letters. 
4. News. 
Source: Court of Auditors annual report. 
 
6. The Audit of Paying Agencies: the AGEA case 
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The Agency for Withdrawals in Agriculture (AGEA) is a non-economic body governed by public law, established by 
legislative decree no. 165 and subsequent amendments and additions (DeNichilo 2011). It is subject to surveillance by the 
Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Policies. The organization, structure and functioning are defined and regulated in 
addition to the legislative decree of 27 May 1999, n. 165 and subsequent modifications introduced by the legislative decree n. 
188 of 2000 and by law 21 December 2001, n. 441, by the AGEA Statute approved by ministerial decree no. 736 of June 14, 
2002, by the Administration Regulations approved by ministerial decree of June 14, 2002 and by the Personnel Regulations 
approved also by ministerial decree of June 14, 2002. Pursuant to article 10 of legislative decree no. 165/99, as modified by 
law no. 441/2001, a Monocratic Office is entrusted with the exercise of the functions of paying agency, which has the task of 
ensuring the efficiency of the management and control structure of Community aid, without prejudice to those of other paying 
agencies, through the adoption of procedures aimed at the most rational use of resources, tools and resources in full compliance 
with current Community regulations (Hada, Luga and Căruț 2019). 
The bodies of the Agency are: President, Board of Directors, Representative Council, Board of Auditors, Court of Auditors. 
The executive structure of the AGEA, as required by the Staff Regulations (14 June 2002) and articulated with resolution no. 
44 of 19 July 2002, is made up of: 
a) Monocratic Office, responsible for the Paying Body pursuant to Regulation (EC) no. 1290/06 established with law 
no. 441 of December 21, 2001; 
b) Coordination Area, which performs the functions of Coordination Body pursuant to Regulation (EC) no. 1290/06 
and of the regulation (CE) n. 885/06. 
The two functions are distinct under the organizational, administrative, functional, managerial and accounting aspects 
pursuant to and in compliance with EU and national legislation. 
The Monocratic Office performs the functions of paying agency pursuant to regulation (EC) no. 1290/06 and coordinates, 
determines the guidelines and objectives, the following areas subordinated to it: 
a) Administrative Area, which is made up of the "General, Financial and Cash - Personnel Affairs" Office, the 
"National Budget and Management Control Accounting Office" and the "Community Litigation" Office; 
b) Payment Authorization Area, which consists of the "PAC, Fodder and Oil" Office, the "Rural Development" Office, 
the "Single Application and Fruit and Vegetable Management" Office, the "Promotion, Quality Improvement and 
Social Aid" Office, of the Office of the "Community Litigation"; 
c) Controls Area, which consists of the "Accounting" Office, the "Technical Service", the "Payments Execution" 
Office and the "Relations with Paying Bodies and SIAN" Office. 
d) The Coordination Area performs the functions of Coordination Body pursuant to Regulation (EC) no. 1290/06; in 
particular: 
- coordinates and monitors the activities carried out by the paying agencies recognized in compliance with 
regulation (EC) no. 1290/06; 
- takes care of the harmonization of the operational procedures for the implementation of the community 
legislation relating; 
- provides national aid, ensuring its compatibility with EU legislation. 
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The types of intervention that the Community internal control service can implement are the following: 
a) Compliance Audit: focuses on verifying the compliance of the procedures adopted by the paying agency with 
EU legislation, and verifying the compliance of the components with the internal rules and procedures, applicable 
to the context of the operating structures and operations under examination. 
b) Operational Audit: verifies / assesses the adequacy, regularity, reliability and functionality of systems and 
processes / procedures, methods (codification) and resources in relation to objectives, organizational structures. 
c) Financial Audit: these are actions aimed at verifying the adequacy of existing accounting, administrative and 
financial controls. Their objective is to verify that there is a correct and timely recording in the institution's 
accounts (with particular regard to the EAGF and EAFRD accounts) and that the economic and financial 
statements present the results of the year in a "true and correct" manner and the financial and equity situation at 
the end of the financial year. Systematically the purposes of a financial audit can relate to the reliability of the 
accounts, the legality and regularity of the operations and the verification of its financial management. 
d) Follow-up (Monitoring of corrective actions): these are interventions for verifying the effective implementation 
of the corrective action plans agreed with the process managers, in the face of the observations found during 
previous interventions, audits or process mapping , of the Service and shared by the process managers 
themselves. 
At the date of this paper, the Internal Control Service is organized into the following basic specialized units, identified by 
the homogeneous environment of action of the paying agency, as classified by the EU guidelines, aggregated into homogeneous 
areas by subject of verification: 
a) Universe "EAGF Sigc / No Sigc" divided into: 
- EAGF (European Agricultural Guarantee Fund) schemes covered by the SIG, i.e. the support schemes referred 
to in Titles III, IV and IV bis of Regulation (EC) no. 73/2009 of the Council including the agri-environmental, 
forestry, less-favored areas and areas with environmental restrictions, if the same sectors are included in the 
temporary instrument for rural development. In particular, this unit deals with the authorization procedures 
(administrative and on-the-spot checks), execution of payments, accounting that take place in application of the 
Integrated Management and Control System in the EAGF environment; 
- EAGF (European Agricultural Guarantee Fund) schemes not covered by the SIGC, i.e. any other support scheme 
paid by the EAGF including any other scheme not covered by the SIGC which is part of the Temporary 
Instrument for Rural Development. In particular, this unit deals with the authorization procedures (administrative 
and on-the-spot checks), payment execution, accounting, advances and guarantees that take place outside the 
scope of the Integrated Management and Control System in the EAGF environment. 
b) Universe "EAFRD Sigc / No Sigc" divided into: 
- EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development) schemes covered by the Sigc, i.e. the support 
schemes borne by the EAFRD referred to in Article 6 of Regulation (EC) no. 1975/2006. In particular, this unit 
deals with the authorization procedures (administrative and on-the-spot checks), execution of payments and 
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accounting that take place in application of the Integrated Management and Control System in the EAFRD 
environment; 
- EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development) schemes not completed by the Sigc, i.e. the 
support schemes borne by the EAFRD referred to in Article 25 of Regulation (EC) no. 1975/2006. In particular, 
this unit deals with the authorization procedures (administrative and on-the-spot checks) for payments and 
accounting that take place outside the scope of the Integrated Management and Control System in the EAFRD 
environment. 
c) Universe Credits divided into: 
- credit management within the EAGF; 
- management of EAFRD credits. 
d) Advances and Guarantees universe: deals with the procedures relating to the management of the amounts paid in 
advance and the guarantees given in favor of the paying agency. 
e) Public Storage universe: deals with procedures relating to public storage and community inventory management. 
7. Methodology 
7.1 Human Resource Performance Model 
This paper analyzes factors that explain the increased use of special reports by the Court, such as the accountability 
methodology, wondering if they resemble evaluation studies. Their training examines their impact, as well as the institutional 
use implicit in the performance audit (DeNichilo 2013). 
What factors and circumstances explain the increased use of special reports? The work shows how the interpretation of the 
Court has political implications and serves to promote its institutional interests in the battlefield to define "responsibility" and 
in what concerns it. 
Evaluation in the EU is often conducted externally, offered to various consortia of academics, researchers and consultants 
who respond to assess the performance of political programs. Several multilevel stakeholders will conduct their assessments 
and choose from a mix of qualitative and quantitative data (DeNichilo 2019b). For the executive, its main purposes are: to 
contribute to the planning of interventions, including providing input to establish political priorities; assist in the efficient 
allocation of resources; improve the quality of the intervention; and report on the results of the intervention. This presupposes 
feedback in the political cycle, although theory does not always extend to practice. Audit is therefore an essential part of 
evaluation in the EU, contributing to the realization of financial responsibility, but also, maintaining the institutional legitimacy 
of the decision-making system (Spaventa 2008) In short, audit and evaluation are both key elements in the process of democratic 
accountability, but the question of what is accounted for and who is taken into account is central to the debate and in the EU. 
Like the audit, the performance assessment function is to allow for accountability, but there is also an emphasis on collective 





European Journal of Social Impact and Circular Economy - ISSN: 2704-9906  
DOI: 10.13135/2704-9906/4608 Published by University of Turin http://www.ojs.unito.it/index.php/ejsice/index 
EJSICE content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License   
29 
7.2 Data and Sampling         
This study analyses the characteristic and the determinants of the Legislative Decree 286/1999 in quality of  Advisory Body 
in 102 Act’s Director of paying agencies AGEA at 31.12.2013 (Caiden 2000).  In sampling process we lost 1,04% of total 
universe of investigation and analyzed 102 executive positions.   
 
Tab. 2 Identification of the survey sampling at 31.12.2013. 
Total  operational employees at 31.12.2013 64,96% 
Total employees of the service organization at 31.12.2013 34% 
Total universe of investigation at 31.12.2013 98,96% 
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
Tab. 3 Unavailable data. 
Description  Data 
Number of total Advisory Body Act's Director 120 
Unavailable data of Advisory Body % (Qualification, Number, Independence) 15% 
Number of Advisory Body object of analysis 102 
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
Our elaboration takes into consideration the year 2013 as there was the least amount of loss of data and with a minimum 
time span of five years to be able to evaluate the audit opinion in full independence (AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and 
AGEA PwC Special Report 2014). 
 
7.3 Research Design: Framework and Hypothesis 
There are a number of theoretical arguments as to why corporate management might elect voluntary to provide particular 
information to parties outside the organization. These arguments were grounded within “Positive Accounting Theory”, but 
there are some alternative theoretical perspectives that address this issue.  
These theories are: 
a) Legitimacy theory; 
b) Stakeholder theory; 
c) Institution theory. 
Legitimacy theory has become one of the most cited theories within the social and environmental accounting area. 
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The author believes that legitimacy theory does offer a powerful mechanism for understanding voluntary social and 
environmental disclosures made by corporations, and that this understanding would provide a vehicle for engaging in critical 
public debate. 
The problem for legitimacy theory in contributing to our understanding of accounting disclosure specifically, and as a theory 
in general, is that the term has on occasion been used fairly loosely. This is not a problem of the theory itself, and the observation 
could be equally applied to a range of theories in a range of disciplines.  
Follow there are the hypotheses of the paper that we have identified using the theory of legitimacy, in particular we have 
identified corporate governance hypotheses, assumptions of positive and negative potential audit evidence (Rolle 2010). 
 
Tab. 4 Framework Hypotesis 
H1: There is negative association between impact of debt register evidence and Quality of Advisory Body. 
H2: There is a positive association between internal audit statistics evidence and Quality of Advisory Body. 
H3: There is a positive association between squeeze-out audit evidence (external job positions) and Quality of 
Advisory Body. 
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
7.4 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is directly observed by visiting and explores the corporate website. 
The characteristics of Corporate Report (CR) disclosure is classified in three categories: 
a) Number of Member of Advisory Body (NUM). 
b) Qualification Member of Advisory Body (QM). 
c) Independence Member of Advisory Body (IND). 
 
This three aspect determine the Quality of Supervisory Body in Italian paying-agencies. The concept of social disclosure 
means providing adequate information about the events of the organization and its activities for the users of that information in 
order to enable them to make and take the decision (Costa 2009). 




Tab. 5 Costruction Data Evidence 
First Evidence: There is a positive association between Number of Advisory Body (NUM) and Quality of Advisory 
Body: 
The number of Advisory Body varies from 1 to 3 in an Organization Settings Staff Unit. 
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a) L consist in Legal Affairs (lawyers) who demonstrate that they have significant experience in the criminal 
law of the economy over 15 years; 
b) IA consist of Internal Auditor Staff and Line (cyber audit)  who demonstrate that they have significant 
experience in corporate compliance and in the analysis of corporate reporting procedures over 10 years; 
c) O is represented payment operator who demonstrate significant experience in audit evidence over 15 year. 
d) E consists of the category Engineers in Operational Auditing and Environmental Impact Assessment who 
demonstrate significant experience in re-performing audit evidence on site over 10 years. 
Third Evidence: There is a positive association between Independence of Advisory Body (IND) and Quality of 
Advisory Body: 
The variable independence ranges from 0 to 1. 
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
This three hypothesis introducing social responsibility legitimation role of Legislative Decree 286/1999 in Italy (Noe 2006). 
The Quality composition of Advisory Body legitimates their Quality of the Audit to preventing fraud and corruption and 
legitimates trust in the “ritual of verification”(Mendez 2011).   
 
Tab. 6 Corporate Disclosure of Legislative Decree 286/99. 
Examined Disclosure Dependent variable 
 
Value at 31.12.2013 
Number of Member of Advisory 
Body 
NUM (1;2;3) 






Independence Member of Advisory 
Body 
IND Variance 0-1 
Indipendent	members	OdV
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑂𝑑𝑉  
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
Tab. 7 Descriptive statistics of Corporate Disclosure of Legislative Decree 286/99. 
Examined statistics Number of Member of 
Advisory Body 
Qualification Member of 
Advisory Body 
Independence 
Member of Advisory 
Body 
Median 2,8 7 0,7 
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Mean 1,5 5,5 0,5 
Variance 0,21 6 0,30 
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
7.5 Research Model 
To tested the hypotheses we used the research model specified in the follow equation: 
𝑆!= a0 + a1 (Debt Register Evidence) + a2 (Internal Audit Statistics) + a3 (Squeeze-out Audit Evidence) + ξ  
 
Where: 
Symbols Description  Value al 31.12.2013 
a0 Intercept External Audit Impact 





Internal Audit Statistics Inspection Evidence ∏10!.  log Inspection 
Squeeze-Out Audit Evidence Dummy [0;1] 
Ξ Residual Residual Funds Access 
 
7.6. Results 
The table 8 contains the descriptive statistic of the independents variables. 
 
Tab. 8 descriptive statistics.   
Variable Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Debt Register Evidence 12,5 2,59 1,05 20,35 
Internal Audit Statistics 1,5% 0,99% -2,50% 40,50% 
Squeeze-Out Audit Evidence 0,50 0,25 0 1 
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
Our sample covers a wide range of data: some very small, some very large. They have median debt register equal to 10,22; 
the median of audit statistics is 3,55%. They are generally not highly squeeze-out audit, considering that they have a squeeze-
out audit that is on median equal to 0,12. 
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Tab. 9 – Multivariate regression  
Regress Model 
 
Coefficient T value P>t 
Intercept -1,8 4,50 0,01*** 
Debt Register 
Evidence 
-2,4 2,5 0,99 
Internal Audit 
Statistics 
0,2 4 0,01*** 
Squeeze-Out 
Audit Evidence  
0,5 -2,5 0,45 
R2 0,55   
* ** *** Significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level. 
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
 
The model is significant (0,01 level) and the adjusted R2 are 0,55. 
The independent variable has significant result (0,01 level) is internal audit statistics (H2). 
 
8. Conclusions 
This study analyses the characteristic and the determinants of the Legislative Decree 286/1999 in quality of  Advisory Body 
in 102 Act’s Director of paying agencies AGEA at 31.12.2013.  
The multivariate analyses shows a positive significant related, to the companies have high internal audit statistics have high 
quality of Advisory Body, this fact is consistent to the legitimacy theory. 
To future research predicts increase the characteristics and analyses comparatively to other country so it is possible. Some 
limitation should be considered, in particular the incidence of unavailable data  of number, composition and independence of 
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Figure 1. Control activities of  organization settings (D. L.vo 286/1999). 
          
Activities Strategic evaluation 
and control 
Management control Evaluation of managers Administrative 
accounting control 
          
Recipients Political bodies Executives in direct 
contact with the political 
policy body 
Executives in contact 





          
Object Guidance documents, 
management documents 
of executives who 
interact with political 
policy bodies 
Economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness of the 
organizational entity to 
which the manager is 
responsible 
Performance and 
organizational skills of 




          
Source: AGEA PwC Audit Reports 2011-2013 and AGEA PwC Special Report 2014 
 
In conclusion the paying agencies that have high profitability of internal audit statistics have high quality of Advisory Body, 
this legitimates their Quality of the Audit to preventing fraud and corruption and legitimates trust in the “Ritual of Verification” 
(DeNichilo 2019c).  
The increase in public debt in the euro area during the crisis, although more contained than that of the entire world of mature 
economies, has opened up a front that has not yet closed. The question of the possible negative effects of a high public debt is 
ancient. In general, there is a certain consensus on the idea that, through various channels, a very high debt may hinder growth, 
even if the relationship is very uncertain, and, above all, it is excluded that a threshold beyond which the effects may be 
identified negatives become particularly severe. The model dealt with in this paper is a starting point on the analysis of the 
immunization of public finance processes. The limitations of the work concern the difficulty in finding the data and the 
continuous updating of the data which in the stochastic processes of financial immunization represent the password (DeNichilo, 
Pedone 2009).  
 
9. Discussion 
The Court is transparent in the delivery of reports, publishing them online, freely accessible to stakeholders and citizens. 
However, it perceives accountability not as merely about visibility or transparency, but as ultimately resisting on parliamentary 
scrutiny and action, legislative responsibility underpins democracy. At the supranational level there is a “triangle of 
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accountability” between the European Court of Auditors (external controller), European Parliament (principal, scrutinizer, 
democratically accountable) and European Commission (auditee, non-elected, jointly responsible for managing and 
implementing EU funds). There is no clear-cut hierarchy among the institutions. Furthermore, the approach to, and practice of, 
audit across member states continues to require harmonization and the adoption of common standards. The soundness and value 
of parliamentary scrutiny remains open to question, in term of both recouping funds and influencing policy redesign. 
Nonetheless, performance audit itself, as a process of “accounting for” budgetary implementations, follows a clear logic of 
decision-making, research, analysis, drafting and reporting, thus constituting a series of sub-processes. Policy-makers are 
increasing focused on issues of performance in audit, given budgetary constraints and the financial and political implications 
of audit for future policy. “Performance”, though evidence-based and drawing on quantitative data, is about framing and 
institutional discourse, ultimately value-driven and normative (Stephenson 2015).  
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